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Abstract
Several models predict that both market liquidity and trading vol-
ume generated by less informed traders do not increase when there is
insider trading. Available empirical evidence is mixed and still rela-
tively small, because of the inherent di¢ culty to identify insider trad-
ing events. Our econometric work, based on 19 suspect insider trading
events drawn from the non-public ￿le of the Italian supervisory au-
thority, provides further insight on these key implications of stock
market models. The second purpose of this paper is to assess whether
insider trading changes the distribution of volume and returns in a
way that can be used by supervisory authorities in order to detect its
presence through statistical methods.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies trading volume, returns and liquidity when there is insider
trading. Several models, which follow the seminal analysis in Kyle (1985),
predict that the insiders￿presence in a stock market is associated with price
run-ups (downs) when the insiders￿news are good (bad). Moreover, trading
volume generated by less informed traders should not increase as the insider￿ s
desire to sell or buy implies a higher than average probability of losing money
for the trading counterpart. For the same reason the market becomes less
liquid because market makers broaden the bid-ask spread so as to cover higher
anticipated losses to the insider.
The empirical evidence concerning the occurrence of these e⁄ects is rel-
atively small, because of the inherent di¢ culty to identify insider trading
events even when it is not illegal. Indeed, an insider avoids diluting the value
of private information by taking actions that would reveal it to other market
participants too quickly. For instance the insider may rely on several brokers
so as to hide the size of her overall trade to each of them. She may distribute
her trades over time so as to prevent generating a burst in the order ￿ ow,
which would be interpreted unambiguously by other market participants.
Given this strategy of hiding behind other traders￿trades, data on in-
sider trading are costly to ￿nd. Such data are gathered by stock market
authorities when it is banned by the law, but illegal insider trading ￿les
are often non-public. One detailed analysis is provided by Cornell and Sirri
(1992) con￿rming the existence of a price run-up, while challenging the view
that liquidity and uninformed trading volume do not increase. This evidence
refers to one case only, however. The large sample of prosecuted cases used
by Meulbroek (1992) also con￿rms the price run-up occurring in the days
when insiders are in the market, but outsiders￿abnormal volume is equal
across insider trading days and other days. Fishe and Robe (2004) analyze
a recent court case involving 116 publicly traded companies, con￿rming the
outsiders￿volume puzzle while arguing that market depth falls. Our econo-
metric work is based on 19 suspect insider trading events occurred in the
1990s, drawn from the non-public ￿le of the Italian supervisory authority,
CoNSoB. To preview the results, we also ￿nd a price run-up, together with
an increase in liquidity when insiders trade.
The assessment of returns and volume during illegal insider trading days
is also useful for regulatory enforcement. Estimates of abnormal returns can
be used by courts for proving the ￿materiality￿of inside information. This
is related to the sum of abnormal returns (CAR) over the days in which the
inside information was available up to and including the announcement date.
If CAR is statistically di⁄erent from zero, then the information traded on by
2insiders was able to a⁄ect prices - in other words, it was material. Courts also
rely on CAR for deciding on the penalty of the defendant (￿disgorgement￿ ),
when the law mandates a penalty proportional to insider trading pro￿ts.
These are estimated as the product of CAR during the holding period times
the quantity purchased or sold by the insider (Mitchell and Netter, 1994).
Last but not least, the detection of illegal insider trading is not straight-
forward as the insider￿ s strategy consists in hiding behind other traders￿
trades. Statistical detection can rely on abnormal price and volume move-
ments, but these are also observed in conjuction with public announcements
which need not always be associated with insider trading activity. We pro-
pose two ways to identify insider trading, that rely on a change in the time
series pattern of returns and volume when there is insider trading. According
to the model of He and Wang (1995), insider trading has persistent e⁄ects
which are discernible ￿long￿ before the announcement dates, whereas an-
nouncements without insider trading a⁄ect volume and returns only in the
days immediately preceding and following the information release. Moreover,
insider trading could be distinguished from public information because news
have a marked e⁄ect on returns and none on traded volume when there is
homogeneous information in the market before the news and the updating
method is the same across investors (Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Thus the
￿rst method studies whether insider trading increases the autocorrelation of
returns and volume, whereas the second method focuses on the di⁄erential
reaction of volume and returns to announcements.
Corporate insiders disclose their legal trading in the US and a few other
countries to the stock market authority, which makes this information avail-
able to the public. There is a growing literature studying whether these
trades help predict future returns and the associated corporate insiders￿abor-
mal trading pro￿ts (Seyhun, 1988; Zaman, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).
We prefer using investigation data, since the private information content of
these o¢ cial trades is still debated (Cohen et al., 2011; Eckbo and Smith,
1998; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, 2003). However, the empirical analysis
by Cao et al. (2005) con￿rms that market depth increases while directors
and o¢ cers trade based on the expiration of lock up provisions after IPOs.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we describe the
behaviour of volume and returns around public announcements with and
without insider trading, and review previous empirical work on US data.
In section 3 we describe the non-public investigation ￿le and our sample,
contrasting its characteristics with Meulbroek￿ s sample. Section 4 presents
empirical results. Concluding comments follow.
32 The behavior of returns, volume and liq-
uidity: some previous results
The pattern of volume and returns in a stock market depends on traders￿
preferences, on the initial distribution of information across market partici-
pants and on the way they process news.
If there is homogeneous information, the short-run time-series behaviour
of expected returns is in￿ uenced by volume (or turnover), which is in turn
determined by orders placed for liquidity reasons. Volume reduces the auto-
correlation of returns because risk-averse speculators and dealers accept to
bear larger risk - which is associated to larger liquidity orders - by increasing
the required return. If liquidity orders are i.i.d., conditional on low liquid-
ity orders yesterday (and therefore low required returns), high liquidity or-
ders (and therefore high required returns) tomorrow are expected (Campbell,
Grossman and Wang, 1993).1
Consider now the possibility that some public announcement takes place.
If there is homogeneous information before the announcement there is no mo-
tive for trade among agents who similarly update their forecasts. There can
be a marked price variation - if some information was unexpected - but there
should be no abnormal trading at the announcement date, because there is
no a priori reason for orders related to liquidity motives to become more
frequent around announcements (Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Homogeneous
information among market participants is likely when future announcements
refer to macroeconomic events. Indeed Jain (1988) ￿nds a strong price e⁄ect
of certain macroeconomic news, whereas there is no signi￿cant reaction in
turnover. As far as ￿rm-relevant events are concerned, Kandel and Pearson
(1995) also show that excess volume is concentrated on dates {-1,0,+1}. Ab-
normal trading and excess absolute returns are also found by Morse (1981)
in those same days only2. Event studies focussing on take-overs ￿nd a more
marked e⁄ect prior to announcement dates, namely a price run-up during 10
1To capture the interaction between voume and the (￿rst-order) autocorrelation in
returns, they estimate the following equation:
rt+1 = ￿ + (￿1Vt + ￿2V 2
t )rt + "t
where r is daily aggregate return and V is daily aggregate detrended log turnover. They
￿nd ￿1 < 0 and statistically signi￿cant as expected, and no strong evidence for nonlinear-
ities (captured by the squared-volume term). This relationship also holds for individual
stock return, with the aggregate turnover ￿gure as a measure of volume V .
2Penman (1982) ￿nds some excess returns in day -3 as well. However, he uses a di⁄erent
approach in that he estimates normal expected returns with a speci￿c parametric model,
namely the CAPM.
4to 20 days preceding the announcement (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). However
Gupta and Misra (1989) argue that a large part of the excess return is due to
other kinds of publicly available information, such as rumours in the press.
When companies which were not subject to rumours are examined, there is
no excess return but in the day prior to the announcement. Hence, there is
little or no evidence of abnormal behaviour preceding day -1 for in samples
of US company announcements, once rumours in the press are accounted for.
When there is insider trading in the market, the asset price approaches
the value implied by the inside information over time so that there should be
no price surprise upon the announcement if insider trading is unregulated.3
Orders placed by insiders push up total trading volume while orders placed
for liquidity reasons should not change (Kyle, 1985; Foster and Viswanathan,
1996; Back Cao Willard, 2000)4. The bid-ask spread charged by risk-neutral
market-makers widens (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), as they expect to lose
when they ￿ll the orders placed by insiders, and need to gain more from less
informed traders. As a consequence market liquidity falls.
It would be wrong to conclude that all abnormal trading occurring before
or after public information is due to insider trading. When speculators have
di⁄erent signals with equal precision, a public announcement generates vol-
ume of trade because investors correct their previous forecasts with di⁄erent
intensity (Grundy and McNichols, 1990). Excess volume is concentrated just
prior to and after the announcement because di⁄erently informed specula-
tors bet on the outcome of the news release and close their positions just
afterwards. ￿New public information mainly generates trade in the current
period.￿On the contrary, ￿new private information not only generates trad-
ing in the current period, but also generates trading in future periods. This
implies that when there is private information, independent arrival of new
information can generate serially correlated volume￿(He and Wang, 1995,
p.957-958). High volume is not always a symptom of new information arrival
to market participants, whereas high volume and large price changes are. In-
deed, high volume of trade may not be accompanied by large price changes,
when information is already in the economy and it is being revealed through
prices by the speculators￿trades. When new exogenous information arrives,
3In the Kyle (1985) model, the insider is risk-neutral. While risk-neutrality is not in
general interesting for stock markets (since prices include a risk-premium) an insider often
enjoys highly precise information on the content of the announcement, which makes him
behave as if he was risk-neutral.
4Volume may change if outsiders, endowed with well de￿ned preferences, choose in-
vestment in stocks anticipating future insider trading. If risk sharing gains exceed adverse
selection losses, volume may increase (Bu⁄a, 2004). If the opposite holds, it falls (Bu⁄a
and Nicodano, 2008).
5on the contrary, there is an abrupt change in the investors￿perception of the
stock￿ s underlying value- and high volume is associated with large absolute
price changes.
Cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume for individual
stocks are indeed found during days of illegal insider trading well before the
announcement date after controlling for news in the press. Insider trading,
and the associated abnormal volume and price run-up, typically takes place
6 (median) to 13 (mean) days before the public announcement (Meulbroek,
1992). A similar evidence is presented by Cornell and Sirri (1992). Both
are consistent with the insight according to which new private information
generates a persistent e⁄ect on volume and returns.5 However, the increase
in both outsiders￿volume and liquidity - highlighted by Cornell and Sirri
(1992)- is inconsistent with a key implication of adverse selection models.
Fishe and Robe (2004) con￿rm the outsiders￿volume puzzle, yet they argue
that quoted depth falls in both specialist￿ s and dealers￿market.6 Below we
provide further evidence based on a sample of stock traded at the main Italian
exchange.
3 Consob investigations
The Stock Exchange Authority - upon receiving an insider trading alert -
gathers preliminary information on transactions performed and intermedi-
aries involved. Then it reports the case to the judicial authority with or
without a recommendation to further the enquiry. Our ￿le of CoNSoB inves-
tigations includes all insider trading events occurred from 1991, when the law
was ￿rst enacted, and ￿led to courts before July 1999 with recommendation
to enquire.
The non-public ￿le indicates whether each episode involves insider trad-
ing, manipulation or both. In Table I insider trading investigations are 58,
while market manipulations are 18. The number of suspect insider traders is
311. The list of suspects includes funds, banks, foreign intermediaries, group
holding companies, individual companies as well as investors with (member
of the board, manager..) or without connections with the issuer of the traded
5It is also consistent with the e⁄ects of the introduction of binding restrictions on insider
trading e⁄ected in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1987. Trading volume fell and the
price run-up was smaller when insiders were not allowed to trade (Kabir and Vermaelen,
1996).
6The specialist also increases the spread. Fishe and Robe￿ s experiment refers to 2-
trading days advance knowledge of a column to be published in Business Week, rather
than inside information on a company￿ s future announcement.
6stock. Indeed, the ultimate insider trader may still be unknown to the mar-
ket authority during the investigation7. This is typical in cases involving
foreign intermediaries, that will reveal the identity of the person placing the
order only if requested by courts. Suspect insiders may thus outnumber the
ultimate insider traders, which may explain why the number of insiders per
episodes (5.36) is much higher than Meulbroek￿ s (2.5). The total number
of companies involved in the deals (and not necessarily in the trading) is
111. Each insider trading episode may involve more than one company, for
instance during a merger.
Table II lists the type of corporate event involved. In the vast majority
of episodes (76%), the information concerns corporate control transactions
such as trades of control blocks in the company or its parent, stock issues
or conversions, mergers, restructuring. This ￿gure is similar to Meulbroek￿ s
(79%). Her sample includes many cases of hostile take-overs while in Italy
these were rare because corporate control was highly concentrated during the
sample years.
Records provide information on the trades performed by each insider (or
intermediary), the date, volume and cost. Table III reports pro￿ts gained or
losses avoided by insiders, as estimated by CoNSoB. These ￿gures are not
based on abnormal returns. They are set equal to the di⁄erence between
amount paid by the suspects for buying shares and the amount received
for selling them on the basis of actual transaction data. When stock mar-
ket data record only some purchases (or sales) before the announcement,
CoNSoB assumes that the missing closing transaction was performed on the
announcement date by the insider. In the case of insiders￿sales before a liq-
uidation event, the estimated gain is set equal to the receipts from the sales
-which can be very large. When we exclude (include) the liquidation events,
the per-episode mean pro￿t is equal to 1464.7 (5044) millions lira, with many
cases involving small gains.
In our econometric analysis we focus on all events which took place af-
ter December 1994. We drop previous observations because major market
reforms were implemented in the early nineties,8 altering the time-series of
7This may hold during litigation, as the identi￿cation of ultimate insiders was di¢ cult
for the stock market authority due to its limited investigation powers. Linciano (2003)
analyzes the e⁄ectiveness of insider trading regulation in Italy. A 1998 amendment of the
law required prosecutors to prove that insiders actually used price-sensitive non-public
information.
8In 1991 there were changes in securities regulation, prohibiting o⁄-exchange trading
and dealers. In 1992 a block market began operations. Between 1991 and 1994 there was
a gradual transition from a call auction to a continuous screen-based auction, followed in
1994 by a gradual change to cash settlement and the opening of trading in stock index
futures. These reforms appear to have altered the returns - volume relationship for large
7returns and trading volume. Stocks trading either outside the main market-
place or too infrequently are dropped, thus remaining with 23 events listed
in Table IV. These events involve 22 stocks, which are non-voting in 5 cases.
The types of companies range from small caps to both large private group-
a¢ liated ￿rms and privatising companies, with widely di⁄erent turnover ra-
tios. Table IV also reports the mean and median number of insider trading
days (19.4; 9), which is far higher than the estimate for the US (3.2;2), while
news days (2.3; 1) are not dissimilar (0.7;0). Insiders in Italy also begin
trading much earlier (39.3;17) than in the US (13.2; 6). This di⁄erence can
be ascribed to SEC investigation method, if it focuses attention on the two
weeks preceding announcements only. Alternatively, it may be that timely
reporting requirements are enforced more strictly in the US, thus allowing
less time for insider trading.
4 Empirical Analysis
We collect ￿news￿on these episodes, consisting of articles in the ￿nancial
daily Il Sole-24 Ore concerning the content of the future announcement. We
searched for the names of the company in the year preceding and following
the episode, and kept track of the dates of all articles referring to the future
event (losses, tender) - irrespective of the precision of the information. Daily
data on prices, volume, turnover, the market index and aggregate lira trade
volume have been provided by Borsa Italiana.
4.1 Speci￿cation and estimation method
We estimate three equations for each episode (indexed by i = 1::I), one for
return (Ri), one for number of shares traded (Vi), and one for stock illiquidity
liquid companies (Majnoni and Massa, 1996) and increased volatility of excess returns for
less liquid stocks (Impenna et al., 1995).
8(ILLIQi) with the following speci￿cations:
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The ￿rst control in equation (1), Rmt, is the return on a market index, which
in our case is the MIBTEL index. The regressor Vmt in equation (2) is the
total value of traded shares divided by a ￿market price￿ Pmt obtained as
Pmt = (1+Rmt)Pmt￿1; with Pm0 = 100: Illiquidity in equation (3), ILLIQit,
is measured as the ratio of absolute return to trading volume. This is a
proxy for the price impact suggested by Amihud (2002) and supported by
Hasbrouck (2009), which shows strong correlation with conventional mea-
sures of illiquidity. Since the price impact in several models (e.g. Kyle, 1985)
is de￿ned as absolute return over uninformed volume, we also run the regres-
sion with this de￿nition of ILLIQ. The dummy variables INSIDE, ANN
and NEWSj respectively indicate the days when insider trade occurred, as
reported in the investigation ￿le, and when the announcement and the news
are released. NEWS refer to newspaper articles concerning the inside infor-
mation, as in Meulbroek (1992). Since their precision varies, we insert one
dummy NEWSj for each article in order to allow for di⁄erent impacts. In
the ￿rst two equations we also insert the lagged dependent variable - also
interacted with the INSIDE dummy - so as to check whether there is a sig-
ni￿cant change in the ￿rst-order autocorrelation of the series, as suggested
in section 2.9
We run the three regressions for each stock separately. The initial date
is 150 days before the ￿rst news or insider trade, and the ￿nal date is the
announcement day except when no quotation is available on that day, which
occurs in two cases in our sample. OLS estimates show no correlation of
residuals, and coe¢ cients￿standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
when detected by appropriate speci￿cation tests.
9We also allowed for dependence of returns on contemporaneous volume as in Campbell,
Grossman and Wang (1993), but the regressor itself has no statistical power. Since the
other results are unaltered, we do not report them.
9Table V reports the mean and median coe¢ cient estimates on the ANN,
INSIDE, and lagged dependent variables for equations (1) and (2). To
allow comparability across stocks, the estimated e⁄ects of the ANN and
INSIDE variables on volumes are expressed as percentage of the average
volume traded in the stock over the estimation period. Since our sample is
small, we cannot construct meaningful cross-sectional standard errors and we
report the number of statistically signi￿cant cases. The individual coe¢ cients
are reported also in the last four columns of Table IV. Insider trades have
a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect in 13 regressions out of 21 both on returns
and on volumes; in 20 on either returns, or volume or both. When the co-
e¢ cient of insiders￿trades in the returns equation is statistically signi￿cant,
which occurs in 15 cases, it is possible to compute insiders￿excess pro￿ts
which can then be used to determine disgorgement, as explained below in
section 5. News and announcement days have a statistical signi￿cant impact
on both returns and volume in several episodes. The return autocorrelation
parameter is statistically signi￿cant in four cases: while it is generally ac-
cepted that returns are predictable over longer horizons, it is unusual to ￿nd
this result in daily data for individual stock returns. Volume is predictable,
consistent with the presumption - outlined in section 2 - that private and
inside information get incorporated slowly in asset prices through trading.
Table VI reports estimates for equation (3). The coe¢ cient associated
with insider trading dates, ￿, is negative and statistically signi￿cant in 16
cases out of 21, suggesting that market liquidity increases when there is
insider trading. This supports the ￿nding by Cornell and Sirri (1992) based
on only one court case.
4.2 Insider trades, run ups and volume










where I is the number of insider trading episodes and ni denotes the number
of days with insiders￿trades in each episode i. This measure is obtained as
the sum of three components: announcement, insider trading, and news.




i ￿i and reported in Table V), is equal to 1:1%. Meul-
broek￿ s (1992) estimates are higher (3%, see her Table V, p.1679); however
the median number of trading days in her sample (2) is smaller than in ours
(19:4) suggesting that cumulatively insider trading is more visible on the
Milan exchange than in the US stock markets (6:85).
10The relative size of the announcement component can be related to the
intensity of insider trading. Indeed inside information is incorporated into
prices by the time its public announcement occurs, if insider trading is unre-
stricted (Kyle, 1985), in which case there should be no abnormal behaviour
on announcement dates.10 This is precisely what happens on the Bolsa Mexi-
cana to stocks which are traded only by local citizens, as unrestricted insider
trading takes place in advance of public disclosure (Bhattacharya, Daouk,
Jorgenson and Kehr, 2000). Our results show average abnormal returns on
announcement dates (9:67% in absolute value, as reported in Table V) which
are smaller than in the US (18:50%) but larger than in Mexico (very close
to 0%). The ratio of the price run-up associated with insider trading days











is in￿nite in Mexico, intermediate in Italy (222%, when attention is restricted
to statistically signi￿cant estimates) and moderate in the US (47:56%). This
result may be due to stricter enforcement of insider trading regulation and/or
of disclosure requirements in the US. Indeed the US have a longer tradition
than Italy of prosecution of insider trading, as the law was instituted in 1934
rather than 1991 and the ￿rst enforcement (prosecution in court) took place
in 1961 instead of 1996 (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).11
The mean abnormal volume on insider trading days in our sample is
1.563, that is volume is 156.3% higher than usual (0.93 in Meulbroek). In
section 2 we report that there is no signi￿cant reaction to macroeconomic
announcements in the US (Jain, 1988) which is consistent with absence of
private information among investors since everyone would like to trade in the
same direction. In our sample there is an almost seven-fold increase in volume
on announcement dates, consistent with the presumption that investors who
bought (sold) on both private and inside information sell (buy) to the newly
informed ones after the announcement.
Finally, the average daily quantity traded by insiders signi￿cantly in-
creases in the number of trading days available before the announcement. It
is therefore not the case in our sample that insiders choose to trade more (and
become more visible) when time is shorter. There is also a positive relation
with average turnover in ￿normal￿days, suggesting that insiders trade more
10A similar pattern emerges also when there is an abstain-or-disclose rule for corporate
insiders￿trading (Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001).
11This suggests to experiment this ratio as a metric for the e⁄ectiveness of insider trading
regulation in a cross-country study.
11when higher liquidity provides them with better camou￿ age.
5 Enforcing insider trading regulation
5.1 Disgorgement
Courts can rely on estimated Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for de-
ciding on the penalty of the defendant (￿disgorgement￿ ), when the law man-
dates a penalty proportional to insider trading pro￿ts. These are estimated
as the product of CAR during the holding period times the quantity pur-
chased or sold by the insider (Mitchell and Netter, 1994). Abnormal returns
to insider trading are in turn computed as the di⁄erence between the ac-
tual returns and an estimate of the portion of returns which is associated to
factors di⁄erent from the inside information.
The estimate of abnormal returns is usually based on a simple ￿market
model￿ , with a market return as the sole regressor (Mitchell and Netter,
1994). In Table V news and announcement-day dummies have a statistical
signi￿cant impact on both returns and volume in most episodes. Therefore
the estimate of abnormal returns based on a simple ￿market model￿yields
biased results in general. In other words, the abnormal return is often set
equal to:
ARit = b ￿i (6)
where b ￿ is estimated from the ￿market model￿ :
Rit = ￿i + ￿iRmt + ei (7)
According to our analysis, the speci￿cation for returns should include also
dummy variables for both news and announcement days, and the abnormal
return should then be computed as:
ARit = b ￿i + (b ￿2iINSIDEit)Rit￿1 +b ￿iINSIDEit (8)
using the parameter estimates from equation (1). Equation (7) thus provides
biased estimates of abnormal returns.
5.2 Materiality of Information
Estimates of abnormal returns can also be used by courts for proving the
￿materiality￿of inside information. This is usually related to the sum of
abnormal returns over the days in which the inside information was available
up to and including the announcement date, when the speci￿cation adopted
12is a simple market model (Mitchell and Netter, 1994). If CAR is statistically
di⁄erent from zero, then the information traded on by insiders was able to
a⁄ect prices - in other words, it was material.
Given our speci￿cation, materiality should be linked to the statistical
signi￿cance of:




In our sample inside information appears as material in all episodes. Indeed,
the announcement e⁄ect on returns is below statistical signi￿cance in ￿ve
cases, but in those cases the coe¢ cient of the dummy associated with ei-
ther insider trading or news or both are statistically signi￿cant. It follows
that the inside information is able to signi￿cantly alter prices, which implies
materiality.
5.3 Detection of insider trading with abnormal time
series behavior
Section 2 argues that insider trading is associated with abnormal patterns of
individual volume and returns and that, a priori, these can be distinguished
from pure news and announcements e⁄ects because the former appear and
persist before release dates while the latter closely surround the release time.
Moreover, the e⁄ect of announcements and news on traded volume is negli-
gible compared to that on absolute returns, if there is no private information
and the method for updating information is similar across investors. Figure
1 shows that both news and insider trading usually signi￿cantly a⁄ect both
returns and volume, suggesting that information was not homogeneously dis-
tributed prior to the announcement.
We cannot also detect any systematic ordering in the ratio of absolute
return to absolute volume changes between news and insiders￿dates, while we
expected the former to be lower. There is, however, some clustering of points
around the horizontal axis for the case of news, suggesting less asymmetric
information before news release rather than before announcements. Figure 1
and Figure 2 together show that the response of prices and volumes to public
and private information is not markedly di⁄erent in our sample.
We also checked whether the serial dependence of volume (and returns)
is increased by insider trading. However the latter does not change in a
systematic way the autocorrelation parameter, as shown by the high number
of insigni￿cant estimates of the coe¢ cient ￿2i in Table V. These results rule
out the possibility to re￿ne along these lines existing detection methods.
136 Summary of results and concluding com-
ments
Our econometric results con￿rm the robustness of the speci￿cation for re-
turns used by Meulbroek (1992), with the return on the stock index, the
announcement day dummy and the news date dummies being statistically
signi￿cant explanatory variables. This implies that abnormal returns are
estimated with systematic errors if a pure market model is used. Further
speci￿cations for returns can be investigated in future work following the
large debate on multi-factor analysis.
On the basis of our estimates, inside information can be shown to be
￿material￿in all episodes occurred at the Milan exchange in the 1990s and
considered worth of further judicial investigation by the stock market au-
thority. Moreover, reliable measures of ￿disgorgement￿can be constructed
in ￿fteen cases out of twenty-one on the basis of a statistically-signi￿cant
estimate of the coe¢ cient associated with insider trades.
The comparison between our sample and Meulbroek￿ s suggests that in-
sider trading is more pervasive in Italy than in the US. Indeed, the mean
number of insider trading days is far higher in Italy than in the US, while
that of news days is not dissimilar. Our estimates of abnormal returns on the
announcement date also indicate that the ￿price surprise￿in Italy is smaller
than in the US. Conversely, the average price run-up during insider trading
days is larger in Italy than in the US.
In our sample, insider trading does not change the time-series behaviour
of volume and returns in a way that can be used by supervisory authori-
ties in order to re￿ne existing detection methods. Our results indicate that
it is not possible to devise an alert system based on the changing pattern
of returns autocorrelation, because estimates of the correlation parameter
on insider trading dates are too unstable and imprecise. Moreover, in our
sample there is also no detectable di⁄erence between abnormal return re-
sponse to news and to insiders￿trades, suggesting that there was di⁄erential
information prior to the announcement. However, further insight could be
gained by contrasting the current sample with another matched by size and
announcement type. We expect the suspect sample to feature higher abnor-
mal volume at the announcement date than the matched one, because of
asymmetric information prior to the announcement. Moreover, the suspect
sample should show both higher ￿price accuracy￿and abnormal volume over
the interval from 15 days to two days prior to the announcement, as private
information is incorporated into prices.
Finally, the small size of our sample prevents formal testing of micro-
14structural theories of insider trading. However, our evidence con￿rms both
the price run-up and the increase in liquidity found by Cornell and Sirri
(1992). While these results challenge conventional wisdom based on adverse
selection models with risk neutral pricing, they should not be interpreted
as evidence that regulation is detrimental to the stock market because it
slows down the revelation of information. Indeed, insider trading reduces
other investors￿welfare even when it enhances price informativeness, pro-
vided that its positive e⁄ects on investment (Leland, 1992) and risk sharing
(Bhattacharya and Nicodano, 2001) are o⁄set by ousiders￿trading losses.
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19Table I – CoNSoB Investigation activity  (1991-7/1999). 
 
This table reports the number of both insider trading and market manipulation episodes, which were 
investigated and filed to courts before July 1999 by CoNSoB.  They are listed by the year in which 
the violation occurred. Insider trading events are reported in the first row, followed by the number 
of suspect insiders and by the number of companies involved. Market manipulation episodes are 
listed in the last row.  
The suspect insiders sometimes are unknown (typically in cases involving foreign intermediaries), in 
which case the numbers refer to intermediaries used by insiders. Each insider trading episode may 
involve more than one company (e.g. in case of a merger). 
 
  91  92  93 94 95 96 97 98 99  TOTAL 
               
# InsiderTrading  5  9  10  11  4 8 6 3 2  58 
   # Insider traders  15  21  44  50  28  63  64  10  16  311 
   # Companies  11  20  21  19  8  13  10  6  3  111 




TABLE II- Type of inside information. 
 
This table reports the type of inside information associated with the episodes investigated. Corporate 
control transactions are highlighted in bold. 
 
Stock Conversion  4 
Stock Issue  2 
Control Block Transaction/Tender Offer  25 
Sale/acquisition of another company  3 
Friendly Merger  8 
Restructuring 2 
Losses  3 
(Near) Liquidation  5 
Others  6 










  1Table III- Profit gained (loss avoided) by insiders. 
 
This table reports the year of the violation, the number of insider trading episodes, the total 
profits per year as well as the mean, minimum and maximum profit per year.  
Profits reported in this table are estimated by CoNsoB. These are the insider's holding 
period gains, calculated from actual buy and sell prices when available. If the insider's 
position is still open after the public announcement, CoNsoB assumes that the insider 
closed it at the first price prevailing after the announcement.  
 
In the case of liquidation, the estimated gain is set equal to the amount of sales. When 
liquidation events occur in a given year, we report the statistics including these cases in 
parentheses. Figures are in thousand euro.    
 
 # Total  Mean  Min  Max 
        
1991  5 371.3  74.1  6.7  222.6 
1992  9 1594.8  177.2  11.9  1084.6 
1993  8(10)  3782.5  (40300.7)  472.8  (5037.6)  5.2  2685.6  (22724.1)
1994  11  15590.1  1417.4 5.7 7746.9 
1995  3 1357.2  447.8  14.5  1239.5 
1996  6(7)  8234.9  (41029.9)  1372.5  (5861.3)  27.4  5061.3  (32795) 
1997  5(6)  10061.1 (57576)  2012.4  (9596)  82.2  6713.9  (47514) 
1998  3  1053.1  350.1 49.6 619.7 
1999  2 965.8  482.9  242.7  723 
 






 This table describes our sample. The first column reports letters instead of company names, which is allowed only after January 1998. The 
following columns report the types of traded stock (voting, V, or non-voting, NV); the type of inside information; the number of days with 
insider trading, with news, with insider trading on news dates; the number of days between the first trade and the announcement date (t=0), 
as well as the time between the first news in the press and the announcement.  The next column shows whether there was a suspension of 
trade on a news date or at the announcement date (t=0) etc.  Turnover is computed as average traded volume over market capitalization 
during the first thirty days of the sample. A turnover of 55.5 means that 0.0558 of market cap was traded on average. The sign (♦) in the 
first column denotes that the episode featured both insider trading and market manipulation. The sign § in the third column denotes that 
there was insider trading on the announcement date as well. 
 
The last four columns summarise the estimates of the effect of announcement and of insiders’ trades on returns on the quantity traded, once 
market movements and news in the press are allowed for. Details on the specification can be found in table V. A star denotes statistical 





































A(♦)  V Block  9  1  0  50  1    55.8  0.046** 5.80** 
 
0.019** 1.170** 
B NV  Block  6  1  0  40  1    44.8  0.093** -1.08  0.026**  2.533* 
C V  Block  52  1  0  138  1  News 
and 0 
2.94  NA NA 0.002 0.588** 
D V  Losses  3  2  0  2  40    14.2  0.297 34.70**  -0.011  7.905** 
E V  Liquid  96  9  2  187 289  0  24.4  NA NA -0.006*  1.073** 
F V  Acq/Sale  8§  1  0  17  54    2.6  0.036** 2.85**  0.009**  0.924** 
G (♦)  V Block  10§  0  -  28  -    5.3  0.026 3.56**  0.008*  1.348** 
H V  Tender  18  1  0 46 2  News 
and –1 
100.1  0.182** 17.23** 0.006*  0.932** 
I V  Block  1  2 1  20  17  Many 
days 
2.8  0.068** 4.52**  0.045**  2.500** 
J V  Merger 10  0 0  10  0  -1 113  0.190** 14.25** 0.010  1.013** 
K V  Block  31§  4  2  31  49  Many 
days 
39.3  0.0002 -2.87**  0.008*  2.870** 
L V  Sale  14  1  0  161 182    137.7  0.068** 3.12**  0.012  1.978** 
M NV  Sale  6  1  0  8  182    317.5  0.028 3.65**  -0.012  4.157* 
N(♦)  V  Merger  32  0  -  41  -    52      0.066** 14.78** 0.005*  0.974** 
O V  Merger  1  1  0  1  46    339.5  0.047** 3.09**  0.023**  1.492** 
P V  Losses  3§  1  1  2  1    460.9  0.100** 4.81**  0.026**  0.536** 
Q NV  Convers 9§  3  1  14  132    451.8  0.163** 6.97**  0.013*  1.055* 
R V  Liquid  64  1  0  84  16  Many 
days 
260       
S V  Tender 
(Auction) 
2 3  0  0 126    709.8       
T V  Tender  1  2  0  2  145    117  0.189** -0.47  0.028**  -0.207 
U NV  Convers 13  12  0  12  141    399.4  -0.0002 0.92**  0.0001  0.015 
V NV  Convers 2 Idem  0  5  Idem    246.7  0.001* 0.90  0.007**  -0.169 
Z V  Tender  3  2  0  6  156    22.8  0.240** 12.65** 0.012**  0.133** 
                         
Mean     19.4  2.3    39.3  79.1    175.3 0.097 6.809 0.011  1.563 





  3TABLE V - Econometric Estimates of Returns and Volume 
 
This table reports estimates of  the equations: 
 
     Rit = αi + βi Rmt+ (ρ1i +ρ2i INSIDEit) Rit-1 + γi ANNit + δi INSIDEit + Σj μji NEWSjit +εit 
Vit = αi + βi Vmt+ (ρ1i +ρ2i INSIDEit) Vit-1 + γi ANNit + δi INSIDEit + Σj μji NEWSjit +ηit  
 
The dependent variables are stock return and traded volume, and the regressors are the 
return of a market index (Rmt), aggregate trading volume (Vmt) the lagged dependent 
variable, and dummy variables identifying announcement (ANN , news  (NEWS) and 
insider trading (INSIDE) dates. Regressions are performed on each stock individually.  The 
initial date is 150 days before first NEWS or INSIDE date, and the final date is the 
announcement day, except when no quotation is available on that day. 
 




  Estimated 
coefficient: 
γ  δ  ρ1  ρ2 
          
Mean  9.67%  1.10%  0.066 0.415 









(out of 19) 
15 
(out of 21) 
5 
(out of 21) 
2 
(out of 19) 
          
          
Mean  680.9% 156.3%  0.307  -0.337 









(out of 19) 
18 
(out of 21) 
20 
(out of 21) 
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TABLE VI - Preliminary Econometric Estimates of Illiquidity 
 
This table reports estimates of  the equations: 
     ILLIQit = αi + βi ILLIQmt+  γi ANNit + δi INSIDEit + Σj μji NEWSjit +ξit 
The dependent variable is the illiquidity index, computed as absolute return over lira 
volume, and the regressors are the illiquidity of a market index (ILLIQmt ), dummy 
variables identifying announcement (ANN) , news  (NEWS) and insider trading (INSIDE) 
dates. Regressions are performed on each stock individually.  The initial date is 150 days 
before first NEWS or TRADE, and the final date is ANN except when no quotation is 
available on that day. 
δ Stat significance=17 over 21. 
 
Stock   β  δ  R2  
          
A 583 0,397  -3,76584  0,01438  
    (2,144)  (-8,592003)    
B 306 0,057  -2,13584  0,008334   
   (1,333)  (-0,898585)     
C 248 0,001  -0,139295  0,019986  
   (1,394)  (-5,311693)     
D 459  0,000007  -0,000106  0,145717  
   (4,305)  (-5,400036)     
E 249  0,00047  -0,01616  0,03090  
   (1,91648)  (-2,66309)    
F 225  0,003282  -0,244098  0,026871  
   (1,867560)  (-4,207917)     
G 494  0.002911  -0.083898  0,040992  
   (2,469844)  (-4,943895)     
H 164  0,008649  -0,205498  0,096481  
   (3,303580)  (-3,446374)     
I 279  0,000193  -0,006054  0,075788  
   (4,118913)  (-3,562585)     
J 180  0,012689  -0,697772  0,059079  
   (2,017889)  (-4,181595)     
K 832  0,001770  -0,290423  0,004690  
   (1,173058)  (-6,934810)     
L 784  0,003813  -0,214456  0,004915   
   (1,428970)  (-1,546508)     
M 545  0,001745  -0,125359  0,016522  
   (1,610476)  (-7,660177)     
N 973  0,000163  -0,006092  0,044218   
   (5,511757)  (-1,211728)     
O 426  0,000115  0,003010  0,031986  
   (2,389938)  (2,150867)    
P 318  0,000455  -0,001792  0,242015   
   (7,114185)  (-1,619524)     
Q 386  -0,001119  0,024327  0,010284  
   (-3,069988)  (1,316077)    
T 614  0,0000826  -0,000294  0,165617  
   (9,680032)  (-8,474283)     
U 593  0,018630  -0,624006  0,010787  
   (1,877727)  (-2,190123)     
V 613  0,000256  -0,000502  0,091398  
   (6,905695)  (-6,685908)     
Z 624  0,025429  -1,113959  0,034318  
   (3,109336)  (-7,261023)     Figure 1 - Effect of insider trading and announcements on returns and volumes 
The left-hand side panels report the point estimates of δi (upper) and of γi (lower) in the return and volume equations. The right-hand side 
panels report the t-statistics associated with estimates of δi (upper) and of γi (lower). Points to the right of the vertical axis represent statistically 
significant estimates in the return equation. Points above the horizontal axis represent statistically significant estimates in the volume equation. 
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Figure 2- Effects of news on returns and volumes 
This table represents the point estimates of μij in the return and volume equations (left-hand side) and to the T-statistics associated to them 
(right-hand side). Points to the right of the vertical axis represent statistically significant estimates in the return equation. Points above the 
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